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Religious Culture: Faith in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia
Jerry Pankhurst
The former Soviet Union is undergoing a religious revival. People inside
and outside the Russian Orthodox church are reexamining its ancient
ways, rediscovering its long-forgotten saints, searching its institutional
memory for answers to urgent questions facing the nation. The Western
reaction to this remarkable resurgence of religion in Russia has been
mixed. All observers welcome the fact that free inquiry about religion and
free religious worship have been restored in the Russian Federation. At
the same time, many are concerned about the xenophobic tendencies that
have accompanied the religious revival in Russia and that became
especially evident after the liberal forces suffered a defeat in the
December 1993 parliamentary election. Calls to restore the great Russian
empire sounded by the winners brought to mind the old slogan, "Moscow,
the Third Rome," that had spurred Muscovy in the 16th-17th centuries to
expand its dominion over neighboring countries. The situation is further
exacerbated by a few Archbishops and Metropolitans who exhort the
Russian people to bring the orthodox, unchanging faith -- Pravoslavie -- to
the world.
But Western evangelicals who flock to Russia hoping to save it from itself
find themselves in an awkward position. Ironically, they act as a
missionary force that tries to sever Russian Orthodoxy from its traditional
moorings and in the process could inadvertently transform the present
religious revival into yet another victory for secularism. Just as their wellmeaning counterparts are intent on building capitalism in Russia (a project
no less heroic than that of building communism), Western religionists are
determined to bring the reformation to a country that missed its chance at
religious reform in the sixteenth century. But the Russians have seen all
this before. Was not the Bolshevik Revolution a drive to impose Western
enlightenment on the dark East and to replace its backward mores with
the imported prescriptions for universal happiness?
While we cannot -- and should not -- avoid passing a judgment about the
path that the religious revival has taken in Russia, we need to resist the
temptation of imposing our ready-made schemes on a vastly different
country without doing justice to its unique religious culture. It would be
prudent to defer our judgment until we had a chance to examine the
origins of Pravoslavie and the role it played in the nation's history,
including the transformation that the Orthodox faith and church

institutions underwent during the Soviet era.
The term "religious culture" refers here not only to the life of the Russian
Orthodox Church -- its religious corpus, worship rituals, and organizational
principles, but also to a wider range of social practices that bear the
imprint of Russian Orthodoxy. Russian religious culture has left its mark
on every cultural domain in the nation. Its pervasiveness has much to do
with the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church had been the favored
religious organization in the land from at least the tenth century on.
Adopted as the official faith of all Russias , Eastern Christianity remained
inexorably tied to the state. When the state faltered under invasion and
foreign control, the Church continued to nurture a sense of nationhood for
Russians, preventing society from splintering and disintegrating. When the
state regained its strength, the Church lent its considerable legitimizing
power to the government and the state's imperial expansion. Hence, the
strong historical bond that was formed between Russianness as an ethnic
or national identity and Russian Orthodoxy as a religious affiliation.
By certain Western Christian (e.g., evangelical Protestant) standards,
membership in a church is realized through regular participation and overt
commitment to the church's values and goals. The Russian Orthodox
Church adopts a far broader perspective on membership. One gains
membership in the Russian Orthodox Church first and foremost through
baptism performed at birth and only secondarily through participation in
religious worship. The latter could be very sporadic without affecting the
person's standing as an Orthodox faithful. Barring explicit evidence to the
contrary, one's membership in the Orthodox Church was presumed to be
established if one was born Russian. This applied not only to Orthodox
Christians accepting the Church's authority but also to the so-called "oldbelievers" -- religious sectarians who refused to honor the church's
innovations in liturgy and swore to uphold the old faith in the face of
excommunication and persecution from the official church.
The contiguity between the boundaries of ethnicity and religion in Russia
had important implications for other religious confessions, be this Catholic,
Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, or Buddhist. All those espousing non-Orthodox
beliefs (inovertsy) were hard pressed to maintain their national identity as
Russians and to act in a manner at least outwardly consistent with certain
Orthodox ideas about propriety, authority, and loyalty. The right wing
within Orthodoxy frequently saw conspiracies by the non-Orthodox,
especially Jews, Masons and Catholics, as great threats to Mother Russia
herself. Hence, such inovertsy experienced themselves and were
perceived by others as not fully Russian -- a stigma they continue to carry

today.
In this century, the communist authorities worked hard to stamp out
religious beliefs and replace old notions about Russian nationhood with the
internationalist identity deemed proper for Soviet citizens. However, the
old religious demarcation lines have not been erased completely. The
atheist state professed by Stalin could not escape completely the
formative influence of Russian Orthodoxy. Its vestiges shone through the
public rituals and were clearly visible in the communist craving for political
monopoly, cultural orthodoxy, and sanctimonious rigorism.
How did Orthodox customs manage to survive in atheistic Soviet society?
To understand this phenomenon I want to invoke Clifford Geertz's concept
of "spiritual afterimages" which refers to "reflections, reverberations,
projections" of religious experience in daily life. [1] Formed in an earlier
era, such reflections, reverberations, and projections often resurface at a
later point in the nation's history as moral imperatives and sentiments
that continue to guide national development. These imperatives may lack
the clarity and purpose that distinguished the original precepts, but they
leave a distinct mark on successive generations, on the country's political,
social, and economic practices. During periods of religious revival, spiritual
afterimages regain much of their original vitality, sometimes suppressing
secular social forms and spurring powerful fundamentalist movements.
Along these lines we should see the current religious renaissance in Russia
-- the increased church attendance, the desire to learn about the ancient
saints, the longing for the wonders wrought by the holy people in the
distant past, the renewed pilgrimage to holy places like Valaam (the
monastery complex at the north end of Lake Ladoga) and Sarov (the
home of St. Serafim). Through these practices, the spiritual afterimages of
Russian history are revitalized and reincorporated into the nation's
psyche. Besides these obvious stirrings, there are more subtle ways in
which religious culture affects, and in turn is affected by, the
developments in other domains of Russian culture. This confluence is not
always benign. Given the historical precedents, we have to wonder if the
authority of the Russian Orthodox Church will once again be used to
legitimize the state's imperial ambitions, if the Church is ready to make
concerted efforts to regain its spiritual autonomy, to encourage the
growth of democratic political culture, to facilitate the transition to a
market economy, to serve as a unifying force in these times of trouble.
Such are weighty issues that have direct bearing on the future of Russian
civilization. I cannot pretend to have answers to all the relevant questions,
but I hope that the following discussion will clarify the stakes that Russian

society has in these issues and shed some light on the future of Russian
Orthodoxy.
The Origins of Russian Religious Culture
In 1988, the Russian Orthodox Church marked its first millennium. The
festivities commemorated the time when Grand Prince Vladimir committed
himself and his nation to Eastern Christianity, making it the official faith of
ancient Rus. Vladimir did not seem to meet much opposition to conversion
from the population, but it would be a mistake to conclude that conversion
was always voluntary. The vestiges of ancient folk religion survived for
centuries in Russia , suggesting that it was deeply established in the lands
of Rus. The chronicles and legends record many instances when severe
force had to be used by both Vladimir and his lieutenants. Novgorod 's
conversion in particular was accompanied by a great deal of violence, and
100 years later everyone in the city, except the clergy and the nobility,
remained pagans and not Christians. [2]
The paganism of Rus was weakly institutionalized -- there were no priests,
temples, regular forms of worship, or a complex mythology -- but it
seemed to have resonated deeply in people's hearts. As was generally the
case with the Christianization of pagan nations, the new religion became
more palatable through syncretism. Thus, "Perun the god of thunder
becomes Elijah, with his chariot of fire; Veles becomes St. Blaise, and is
still the patron of cattle." [3] As Fedotov [4] pointed out, the Christian cult
of Mary was blended by ancient Rus with the Mother Earth and the female
goddesses cult, one revolving around birth and the other governing
individual destiny, so that Mary was cast as the mother of all mankind in
Russian Orthodoxy. That is to say, when Christianity came to Rus and the
Divine Motherhood cult was transferred to center on Theotokos ("Mother
of God"), the old pagan mythology continued to evolve in the new
Christian context.
Local cults multiplied in response to this syncretism, and for the first few
centuries after "conversion," the religion of Rus was in effect a "double
faith," with Christian ritual and ceremony overlaying pagan holidays and
festivals. [5] It took about six centuries for Christian piety to sink roots in
the Russian people's heart, but once it did, it emerged in a stark form of
severe ritual observance, constant crossing of oneself, genuflections, long
night services, and the like. [6] At first, only the upper class had any clear
idea about Christianity. The ruling class's religious knowledge remained
insular because the clergy, drawn primarily from Constantinople , often
did not speak Russian and communicated chiefly with the elite. Those

Russians deeply involved in religious life sought to emulate, however
unsuccessfully, the extreme asceticism of the Eastern Christian monastics,
which further distanced them from the population.
Over the next few centuries, the level of piety among the Russian clergy
went down, as it absorbed more native Russians, lost its penchant for
asceticism, and gradually switched to serving the ritual needs of the
population. Whether or not anyone understood the ritual was not an issue
any more. The noted Russian historian, Paul Miliukov, pointed out that the
clergy stratum became rather illiterate at this time (which is why many
Church historians decried this period as that of decline in the Church). Just
as the clergy began to lose its cultural and educational edge, the
population as a whole noticeably increased its level of Christian
observance. By the fifteenth or sixteenth century, the clergy and the
people converged on a middle ground, reaching the level of religious
consciousness not deep enough to satisfy the ascetics but considerably
loftier than the one common at the earlier "double faith" stage.
It was the magic significance of the rite which became the cause and
condition of its popularity [consistent with the old folk cult]. Therefore the
rite served also as a middle course upon which met the upper and lower
strata of Russian faith: the former gradually losing the true conception of
the contents, the latter gradually gaining an approximate understanding of
the form. [7]
During this first 600 years of Christian influence, three major political
developments had great significance for the fate of religion in Russia : the
steady decline of Constantinople, the conquest of Rus by the Mongols, and
the shift of the cultural-political center of Rus from Kiev to Moscow .
Since Rus had allied itself with Byzantine Christianity centered in
Constantinople, it was bound to feel the effects of Byzantium 's steady
political decline. In 1453, the Turks finally captured Constantinople. Greek
influence was not strong enough to smooth out the coarseness of Russian
civilization before the thirteenth century, when the Tartars spread their
yoke over Russia, drastically reducing its contacts with the Byzantines.
Nevertheless, the Byzantine tradition and church administration left their
distinct marks on Russia . This heritage of Eastern Christianity comes to
the fore in the Church's subservience to state authority, a theme which
acquired its very Russian overtones during the next 600 years. The
second major legacy of Constantinople was the notion that the Greek
Church was the only true church, all other Christian churches having fallen
to heresy or corruption. [8] Constantinople continued to be the reference

template for the Russian Church for many more years, but by the midfifteenth century it lost whatever formal control it had over the Russian
Church. The failure to unify the Eastern and Western branches of
Christianity at the Council of Florence sealed the transformation of the
Russian Orthodox Church into an autocephalic religious body.
The choice of Eastern Christianity as a model for ancient Russia had a
profound impact on the Russian Church , its spirituality and the culture
that it fostered. First, there is the forcefully uprooted paganism present in
the syncretic elements and manifest in the magical conception of the rites
of the Church. However sincere and devout the Russian Christian, there is
a sense in which he or she is living an unstable faith that could any
moment devolve into untamed pagan practices. This might be part of the
reason why the Russian Orthodox Church has always been so adamant
about the eternal verities of the faith and the absolute truth it claims to
hold in every religious sense. This persistent claim may reflect the need to
control the undisciplined pagan within. Hence, doctrinal rigidity and
inflexibility in ritual practice are part of Russian religious culture.
Second, Constantinople 's claim that it is the only true successor to the
ancient Christian Church, the claim that denigrated the Western Christian
tradition, undercut the diversity within the Russian Church . Even minor
doctrinal or ritual disagreement among the faithful was feared as inviting
a schism. Christian movements outside the Orthodox Church could only be
judged as heresy, thus subject to repression. Virtually no diversity in
religious perspective or practice could be accommodated. Intolerance of
dissent, therefore, could be listed as another distinct characteristic of
Russian religious culture.
Third, central importance in Eastern Christianity is accorded to the
principle that the church must be unequivocally subordinated to the state.
This precept was consistent with the Byzantine principle of symphonia,
symbolizing the ultimate harmony of religion and government. As the
Patriarch of Constantinople was required to submit to the Byzantine
Emperor, so the Metropolitan and later Patriarch of Russia was to submit
to the Tsar. The Eastern Churches were all built around a national
conception of church. There was no central authority like the Catholic
Pope, but there was a strong authority structure in each national church,
which maintained respectful and concilliar relations with the other national
churches of the Eastern communion. The head of state had to confirm -and sometimes directly appointed -- the head bishop for a national
church. The church and state leaders were to represent for their people
the spiritual unity and truth of the one true church; therefore, there could

be no major disagreement or separation between them. This principle
produced the church subordinated to political authorities, a condition
firmly established in Russia at least from the time of Peter I through the
communist period. In more general terms, this practice informed a culture
in which a discourse about political, economic or social issues could easily
acquire an extra-mundane significance and generate a quasi-religious
zeal. This propensity to raise ideological stakes, to treat routine
differences as if they pertained to sacred matters would become typical of
Russian culture in general and Russian religious culture in particular.
Finally, there was the sharp opposition to the West that reflected the split
of the Christian church into Eastern and Western churches. When the
Western European Middle Ages exploded into Renaissance, Reformation
and Enlightenment, the wall between East and West kept these great
social upheavals from infecting Russia . And when the shock waves from
these momentous developments finally reached Russia , their effect was
only partial, often distorted, and sometimes the opposite of what
transpired in the West. Thus, when Peter I imported Western European
innovations in secular and religious governance to Russia -- most notably,
the senate for the state and the synod for the church -- they were turned
into the instruments of greater authoritarian control rather than broader
popular participation. The state's dominion over the church is still among
the most acute problems facing Russian Orthodoxy.
It would be a mistake to view Russian religious culture in negative terms,
to judge it exclusively by the extent to which it approximates Western
beliefs and practices. Nurtured in the cradle of Eastern Christianity,
Russian religious culture emerged extremely rich in its spiritual values and
esthetics. It produced artistic works that continue to inspire us today. It
had its share of saints and religious workers who spurred the faithful to
keep the nation together when its breakdown seemed imminent. At the
same time, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that its spirituality was
flawed by the state which harnessed Orthodoxy for its imperial purposes,
that Pravoslavie did not always provide moral guidance to the faithful in
their everyday lives, that it failed to explore the interfaces between
religious spirituality and personal freedom implicit in the Christian faith.
These paradigmatic features of Russian religious culture were further
reenforced during the subsequent periods of the national expansion under
the Tsars and the communists.
National Expansion and Orthodox Culture
By the end of the fifteenth century, ancient Rus had been transformed into

the sovereign state of Muscovy. Although there were still the neighboring
states of Crimea, Astrakhan , and Kazan, which threatened the Russian
state, the Tartar domination with its cultural and political insularity came
to an end after the Golden Horde was defeated by Ivan III in 1480. With
Constantinople vanquished by the Turks and the Pravoslavie coming into
its own, the links with Russia 's old benefactor were now only symbolic.
Even though the Patriarch of Constantinople reinstituted communion with
Moscow and repudiated the Council of Florence after 1453 (the move had
been motivated largely by the vain hope of military aid from Rome ), the
Greek Church had irreversibly lost its prestige in Moscow 's eyes.
Nevertheless, the idea of Greek Christianity as the only true religion had
taken deep root, and Muscovy saw itself, after the seeming self-betrayal
and ignominious demise of Constantinople , as the last representative of
the true faith. Popular piety at the time consisted chiefly in formal
adherence to ritual and the magical notion of rite reflecting the pagan
legacy. Very little room was left for the spiritual dimension of the Christian
faith. Authority in the Church was now vested in an indigenous hierarchy.
The lower clergy remained largely illiterate, while the upper clergy and
hierarchs were preoccupied with pleasing the princes who held the power
of appointment and removal. When there was no more Byzantine Emperor
to control the appointment of the Metropolitan, the job quite naturally
devolved onto the Grand Prince, soon to be called Tsar.
At this juncture, political aspirations and accomplishments merged with
religious ideology to produce a peculiar national imagery captured in the
heady slogan: "Moscow, the Third Rome." Its express function was to
symbolize Muscovy's direct succession from the great apostolic see. Rome
, it was reasoned, had fallen to the papal heresy and corruption, and was
succeeded by Constantinople. Now the same diseases had subdued fair
Byzantium. Was not its conquest by the heathen Turks proof of God's
wrath at its heinous departure from the orthodox faith of the Apostles and
Holy Councils? And who else but Muscovy matched in dignity and
orthodoxy the prior supreme sees? Given its cultural and religious
background, these ideas made good sense to 15th and 16th century
Russians. Such ideas furnished fertile grounds on which political
absolutism could flourish. Absolutism in politics had as its natural
counterpart a status quoism in popular piety, a kind of religious formalism
that replaced Christian spirituality and subordinated religious authority to
state imperatives. Now all dissension could be nipped in the bud and
ruthlessly expunged by a sacredly legitimized state power. And since the
Tsar was sanctified by Church authority, any political opposition could

easily be interpreted as apostasy or heresy.
[Thus the Russian Church ] was now left for the first time face to face with
the formidable power of Muscovite absolutism, with neither Constantinople
nor Sarai to defend its ancient privileges against possible encroachments
by the grand dukes [of Muscovy ]. The Church chose the road of
submission and threw its influence to the support of the ambitions of the
Moscow dynasty. [9]
The removal of three metropolitans from their posts during the 16th
century signaled the dynasty's willingness to exercise its powers as a
divinely-appointed authority. [10] That religious and state powers fully
merged became obvious when the Church canonized Prince Vladimir who
turned Russia into a Christian state and the Russian state into a Churchanointed power. Forever after, the religious afterimages embedded in the
Russian faithfuls' psyche reminded them of the state's supremacy in all
spiritual matters. Through the period of expansion following the defeat of
the Tartars, the Church added new saints who likewise elevated state
authority in the spiritual world of the faithful Orthodox believer. Many
princes and tsars were canonized as saints, and especially important were
those who served as warriors preserving the integrity of the Russian
nation. Whatever their personal learning and holiness, Dmitry Donskoy,
Alexandr Nevsky, and St. Sergius of Radonezh (who counselled Dmitry
Donskoy and blessed his troops as they went to battle) distinguished
themselves as actors who aided Russia's military and political expansion.
Under the reigns of Ivan III (1462-1505) and Vasily III (1505-1533), a
reconsolidated Rus made its debut upon the diplomatic stage of Europe as
it expanded westward into the lands controlled by Lithuania. Contacts
were established with the Holy Roman Empire , the Pope, France,
Denmark, and other countries of Western Europe, as well as with Muscovy
's immediate neighbors, Poland , Lithuania, Sweden, Hungary, and the
Ottoman Empire. [11] Under Ivan IV (1533-1584), also known as "Ivan
the Terrible" or "the Dread," Russian hegemony expanded southward to
the Caspian Sea, including much of the older Tartar lands. Now, the
Russian ruler could claim control as far as the Arctic Ocean in the North.
Clearly, this was a time of great political success for Russia , which
extended into the field of religion: Job, the Metropolitan of Moscow, was
consecrated Patriarch of Moscow and all Russias in 1589 by the
Constantinopolitan Patriarch Jeremy. This act, which confirmed the
separation of the Russian Church from Constantinople , must have buoyed
the Russian psyche, for "the Russian Church felt ashamed to be under the
authority [at least technically] of a subject of the sultan." [12] Kluchevsky

attributes this consecration and the psychological boost it gave to the
nation largely to political, rather than religious, developments.
Towards the opening of the seventeenth century that community [of Rus]
was thoroughly permeated with religious self-confidence, but a selfconfidence which was fostered, not by the religious, but by the political,
progress of Orthodox Rus, as well as by the political misfortunes of the
Orthodox East. [13]
From a religious point of view, the only blemish on Pravoslavie's
supremacy in the Orthodox communion was that the Moscow Patriarchate
ranked fifth in the formalized hierarchy of Eastern Christianity, after the
ancient Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria , Antioch , and
Jerusalem , though before the older Patriarchate of Serbia. [14] Russia 's
assertion of its religious superiority and its insistence on being the only
universal church were not without serious drawbacks, however.
As soon as Orthodox Rus proclaimed herself the sole possessor of
Christian faith, that means of correction [of local deviation by universal
Christianity] became lost to her, since, once it had declared itself to be the
Church Universal, the Russian Church community could not very well
permit any extraneous examination of its beliefs and rites. [15]
This effectively arrested the development of Russian Orthodox religion at
the point where the Church Universal doctrine commenced, i.e., in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus, the grandson was obligated only
to believe and practice as his grandfather did. [16] Ivan IV's strict
formalism left a strong impression on the Church of his time, [17] and the
pattern of strict outward piety (ritual, crossings, genuflections, etc.)
became fully established as in the Russian Orthodoxy under Tsar Alexis
(1645-1676), whose police measures forced it upon a previously lax and
often indifferent population. [18]
In fact, under the first Romanov Tsars, Michael (1613-1645) and Alexis,
"The Church . . . was more than ever subservient to the wishes of the
Kremlin." [19] Florinsky contends that in trying to cope with the post"Time of Troubles" political unrest and the contemporaneous enserfment
of Russian peasantry, Michael and Alexis established a "totalitarian state"
in which the church was deeply implicated. In particular, the vast
ecclesiastical landholdings tied the Church to pro-serfdom policies. "In the
man hunt for fugitive serfs, which was one of the distressing
characteristics of this period [seventeenth century], ecclesiastical
dignitaries and the monasteries vied with the lay landlords both in

savagery and in resourcefulness." [20]
The reign of Alexis was marked by one of the most important events in
the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, the "Great Schism" of the Old
Believers. This rupture, which shattered the unity of the Church, was not
the first expression of dissent in religious matters. Russia got its tastes of
religious fissure beforehand with the movements of the Strigolniki, the
Judaizers, and the Volga Hermits. The religious ferment in the Polish areas
in the sixteenth century especially reminded the Russians that they were
also subject to non-indigenous religious traditions. In addition, residents
of the larger cities saw Protestant and Catholic traders and diplomats,
and, beginning with the reign of Michael (1613-1645), Westerners brought
their own faiths along when they were invited to modernize the military
and related economy. However, foreigners lived in segregated areas, thus
reducing the impact of their cultures on local communities. There were
important consequences of the imported and dissenting religions, but the
problem of diversity came to a head only in the Old Believer schism. [21]
This schism tells us a great deal about the nature of Russian Orthodoxy.
The split occurred in reaction to reforms implemented by Patriarch Nikon.
What did Nikon want to change? Looking at the concrete reforms, the
modernized Westerner is struck by their apparent insignificance to overall
faith. The reforms centered on local practices which had become
customary in Russia and acquired an official sanction. The questions at
issue were which icons to use and when, how to spell the name "Jesus,"
how many "alleluias" to say, how many wafers to use in a mass, fingers to
extend while crossing oneself, etc. -- matters pertaining to external
observance of rite and requiring no alteration of dogma. [22]
The reaction to such seemingly innocuous reforms, however, was virulent.
Old Believers contended that the things Nikon wanted to change were
essential to salvation and thus immutable. For its part, the Russian Church
hierarchy countered that the Old Believers had too narrow a mind-set to
distinguish the essential from the superficial and accidental. However, the
most important consequence of the Nikon reform was not for theology or
Church practice but for Church-state relations and, less directly, for the
possible opening to Western influence on Russian society and culture. The
Nikon reforms "impinged upon the most sensitive chord in the attunement
of the Russian Church community -- namely, upon its national selfcomplacency in ecclesiastical matters." [23] The schism splintered the
Church community and weakened its political voice, allowing secular
power to emerge as a sole arbiter in religious disputes. Because many of
its most avid believers went into schism, the Church was left chiefly with

the "lukewarm" and indifferent in religious matters. This led to greater
reliance on the state, police, and army to enforce the faith.
The council that condemned both Nikon and the schismatics seemed to
have been animated by a spirit of special service to the Tsar, some
delegates candidly stating their wish to please him. Patriarchal authority
vis-a-vis the Tsar was greatly diminished. Furthermore, a major decision
of the council was to eliminate the parish election of priests which had
been traditional in Russia , yielding to the bishops the task of assigning
priests to parishes. With the state virtually dictating episcopal
appointments, state control over the Church grew at the grassroots level
as well. Thus, the council's main outcome "was to establish the clear
subordination of church to state by flooding the church bureaucracy with
priests who were, in effect, state appointed." [24] In sum, the schism
reenforced the Church's subservience to the state and seeded more
sanctity to the state authorities. [25]
Seen across the one thousand years of Russian Church history, however,
the Great Schism testified to the growing strength of popular Christian
sensibilities. Even in their confused religiosity, the masses were finally
identified with the Christian church. The Old Believers took the extreme
path, often being pushed to suffering and martyrdom by the oppressive
practices of the Church and the State. However, the plight of Old Believers
dramatized the fact that the broader populace in Russia had been finally
Christianized. Though there were to be some important religious
developments for the elite, the faith of the common person was
established at its general level for the next two hundred years. And while
the Old Believers found themselves repeatedly at the core of peasant
revolts, the regularity with which such revolts were crushed testified to
the impracticality of popular movements in the face of the overwhelming
state power. That pattern lasted into the twentieth century. The state and
church reorganization carried out by Peter I settled the Church
subordination to the state for the remainder of the period of the Russian
Empire. First refusing to appoint a new Patriarch upon the death of
Hadrian in 1700, then replacing the Patriarchate itself with the Holy Synod
in 1721, the Emperor took total control over the Church into his own
hands. Appointments to the Holy Synod and the synod's agenda were
supervised by a lay officer, the Over Procurator, who was himself an
appointee and servant of the Emperor. Consequently, until the Revolution
of February 1917, the Church structure was an arm of the government
bureaucracy and the popular faith languished in its seventeenth century
form.

In the two centuries between Peter's reign and 1917, two other
developments took place that had implications for the modern religious
culture. First is the appearance of a small population of Protestant and
some Catholic believers on Russian soil. Found among German and other
foreign peasant farmers imported by Catherine II to foster efficiency in
agriculture, these faiths slowly began to mix with indigenous sectarians
and Orthodox believers, offering them a glimpse of alternative religious
cultures. Facing strong constraints against growth, including (especially in
the mid-nineteenth century) legal and police barriers against proselytizing,
these tiny groups began to breath and act a touch freer in the early
twentieth century following legal reforms in 1903 and 1905. Still, at no
point did they pose a significant threat to the established order.
Another interesting development goes back to the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century when the elite showed new willingness to explore
the frontiers of faith and engage in a serious discussion about the
indigenous religious culture. The reign of Alexander I held some
precursors, but Nicholas I closed off most avenues for innovation, even as
its harsh rigidity provoked a revolt among the intelligentsia that was
finally ready and willing to confront Western European ideas on their own
merit. In the second half of the nineteenth century the clash of the
Slavophiles and Westernizers was in full swing, with some intellectuals
moving toward full secularization and others, especially toward the end of
the 19th century, increasingly drawn to their Christian roots. I cannot
dwell on this richly nuanced era of philosophical and theological revival.
Let me just note the relative liberality that marked the reign of Alexander
II and that provided a hospitable environment for a creative inquiry into
religious matters. Had historical circumstances gone in other directions,
this flourishing of religious discourse might have served as a launching
pad for a true reformation in Russian Christianity. The Slavophile position
had in itself currents of illiberality, but the arguments of the intellectuals
of the era had begun to grapple with the most negative of these in a
constructive way. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
philosophical and theological renewal clashed with the extreme nationalist,
anti-semitic and xenophobic forces of the "Black Hundreds", which
legitimized the pogroms and reveled in the struggle against all sorts of
conspiratorial enemies of Russia. [26] Too often, churchmen were heard
in support of the scapegoating of Jews by the Tsars and the assertions of
special Russian privilege in a multiethnic empire and multinational world.
Other things being equal, the renewal might have won out against such
forces. Instead, Russia slid into the disorganization and revolts that
engulfed the European continent in the wake of the First World War. And
when the communists took power, the Church's dependence on the state

proved exceedingly costly. The state triumphant was the state which
bound the Church in chains and left the religious institution without the
energy and resources to fend off perhaps the most devastating
secularizing force in history -- Marxism-Leninism.
Religion Under Soviet Rule
Among the features of communist society that continuously fascinated
Western observers was an ambitious Soviet policy aimed at transforming
the human personality. Soviet ideology mandated that the "new Soviet
person" be created from the raw materials of Russian citizenry. [27] The
builder of communism was to be peace-loving, internationalist, patriotic,
law-abiding, collectivistic, hard working, and -- militantly atheist.
To promote atheism and stamp out "religious superstitions" among its
citizens the state authorities and the Communist Party established a
comprehensive educational program -- ateisticheskoe vospitanie, a term
usually translated as "atheist upbringing." The Russian word vospitanie,
for which there is no exact equivalent in English, refers to the general
blueprints for character formation contrived by the Soviet authorities.
[28] As conceived and carried out by the communist party experts, an
atheist upbringing was not a simple educational program, although it was
included in the school curricula and the pedagogical propaganda for the
general public. More than that, ateisticheskoe vospitanie spurred a multifaceted effort across the lifespan to nurture atheism, to turn it into the
way of thinking for every Soviet citizen.
Normally, socialization is designed to inculcate some new knowledge or
skill in the fledgling generation. Atheism, by contrast, is not so much a
new knowledge to be imparted as an old belief to be expunged. Since
religious knowledge of some sort is generally widespread, pursuing atheist
upbringing in the U.S.S.R. was similar to trying to create a vacuum. The
ultimate Soviet Marxist aim was to develop a purified environment where
the particles of religious faith were so rarified that the vacuum in the
religious area could become self-sustaining. In the ideological imagery,
such a situation would represent a pure environment where the full
character development of the new communist person could take place
unhindered. Soviet atheist upbringing, therefore, was not simply the
obverse of religious socialization in the West. The forces working against
atheism were no less entrenched in Soviet Russia than, say, in the United
States , where organized atheism and atheist convictions have been
historically weak in both numbers and popular support. Routing popular

religiosity in the U.S.S.R., therefore, was a truly daunting task.
Furthermore, while atheism is not inconsistent with the secularizing trends
set in motion by urbanization, industrialization, and modernization,
[29]Soviet ideological interpretation was unique in its stated agenda of
speeding up and deepening general secularization, the latter being
construed as a precondition for the emergence of a well-rounded
personality. An atheist upbringing, consequently, went far beyond
attempts to neutralize religion, relegate it to a private corner of the
individual's spiritual life; it implied a coherent anti-religious "worldview"
and an appropriate agenda for action without which Soviet society could
not reach its ultimate -- communist -- developmental stage.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an atheist upbringing in the Soviet
Union differed from religious socialization in the West insofar as it was a
planned effort organized and orchestrated by the Soviet state and
mandatory for every segment of the Soviet population. In other words, it
was state policy and, as we shall see, politics. Thus, even in its basic form,
"scientific atheism" propagated by Soviet ideologues fundamentally
diverged from the largely voluntaristic and diverse activities carried out in
the West under the banners of parochial education, proselytization, and
evangelization.
Political factors. State atheism varied in its nature, focus, and intensity
over the course of Soviet history. This shifting policy meant that
succeeding generations did not experience the atheist program in the
same way, that the program had varying impact on Soviet citizens. We
can count three major antireligious campaigns and one period of dramatic
let up in anti-religious zeal in the pre-Gorbachev period of Soviet history.
[30] The first attack on religion came immediately after the October
Revolution of 1917. Its primary targets were the Orthodox Church and the
Muslim establishment; its immediate aim -- to sap the sources of real and
potential counter-revolution. By the mid 20s, a modus operandi for
religious activities, albeit much more limited and controlled than before
the Revolution, had been established. This rather shaky status quo was
disrupted with a crackdown on religious institutions during the "forced
collectivization" (1928-1933) when many churches and religious
establishments were closed, most significant religious leaders imprisoned,
and religious activity in the country reduced to a bare minimum. This
campaign was followed by a period of severe restrictions of all religious
activities during the 30s.
As World War II broke out, however, the Party leaders realized the

Church's potential as a cradle of patriotic sentiments and dramatically
reversed their stance on religion. Although Stalinist police closely
supervised the reinvigorated religious groups to ensure that the religious
revival would not get out of hand, relative peace prevailed in state-church
relations from 1943 until Stalin's death in 1953. This period ended when
the Khrushchev regime set in motion a new antireligious campaign fully
comparable to the one that rocked the country at the beginning of the
30s. Subsequently, with the demise of Khrushchev in 1964, the campaign
was modulated. The Brezhnev era ushered in some new openings for the
private practice of religion and for official religious organizations, although
pressures continued against religious dissidents and those who would seek
to expand the sphere of religious activities into evangelization, religious
education for children, and church expansion.
In contrast to problems of military security and national economic
development, Soviet state atheism was a relatively minor policy issue.
According to Bociurkiw [31] , the fluctuations in religious policy largely
reflected factors outside the religious sphere, such as nationality, peasant,
industrial or military policy. A closer look at these factors suggests that
Soviet state atheism was largely political in its nature and influence upon
the population. There were many factors extraneous to religion proper
which affected religious policy and thus altered the impact of state
atheism upon the people.
Social and Institutional Factors. An atheist upbringing was shaped by and,
in turn, shaped many social circumstances that had a bearing on
antireligious socialization patterns. Important in this respect is to
distinguish between the individual and collectivist aspects of socialization:
Relative to the individual, socialization means all those processes through
which the individual in interaction with the environment and with himself
develops relatively enduring patterns of behavior which enable him to take
part in societal life and in certain cases, to participate in its change.
Relative to the collectivity, socialization indicates the differentiated, and
under certain conditions contradictory, interaction of all those societal
institutions which express the economical, political and cultural
conceptions of the task of caring for and educating children, who are
ultimately individuals with identities. [32]
Central in this insight is that socialization involves institutional interactions
which may be contradictory at times. The potential for "contradictory"
socialization is something that we should acknowledge from the start.
Anyone who visited the U.S.S.R. could have sensed these contradictions in

the atheist upbringing of Soviet citizens. The Soviet propaganda's
manifest message was unambiguous: religion was to be stamped out as a
vestige of the past impeding progress toward the future society envisioned
by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. However, latent messages conveyed by the
same propaganda were rather confusing to Soviet citizens. For example,
the state-sponsored movement to salvage and restore national
monuments and artistic works extended to certain religious artifacts. It
did not escape notice at home and abroad that the Soviet authorities
adopted an onion dome of the Orthodox Church as the nation's aesthetic
emblem.
In a similarly contradictory way, Soviets celebrated the events and heroes
closely aligned with the nation's religious history. One case in point -- the
state-sponsored festivities surrounding the inauguration of the monument
to Prince Vladimir, long ago canonized by the Church and now holding
aloft the very same cross that once topped the Novgorod monument
dedicated to 1000 years of Russia. Similarly, the communist authorities
honored the Russian icon with its resplendid Christian imagery -- by far
the best-known form of visual art in Russia -- as a national aesthetic
treasure. Literary works by Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and lesser writers
continued to feed religious themes to Soviet readers. Through such
diverse channels religious symbols, myths, and institutional memories
were preserved in the nation whose leaders dedicated themselves to
atheism. Thus, the authorities themselves kept religious sentiments alive
by their inconsistent actions.
In these and many other ways, the institutional context of Soviet atheist
socialization remained highly schizophrenic, causing problems for atheistic
propaganda. While pedagogical institutions doggedly
pursued ateisticheskoe vospitanie, other institutional spheres acted at
cross-purpose. Literature and the arts proved particularly recalcitrant in
this respect, their practitioners unable and unwilling to ignore the religious
and mystical well-springs of earlier creativity. Special mention deserves
also babushka -- old grandmother, the basic source of primary bonding in
Russia, the kind which social psychologists find the most effective in
shaping personal character in its formative stages. [33] Undaunted by
official propaganda,babushka crossed herself, went to church, told her
grandchildren old tales, and in the long run quietly undid what endless
lectures and required readings tried to achieve through formal atheist
upbringing. Soviet authorities were well aware of this menacing presence.
In 1966, one V. G. Shtiuka wrote:
The study of the religiousness of the population shows that religio-cultic

activities which have solidly rooted themselves in everyday life and have
become traditions of family life are the most tenacious. Precisely here
remain the most broad channels for the penetration of religious ideology
and religious worldview into the people's consciousness. [34]
In the landmark studies of displaced persons from Russia that were
carried out following World War II, the Harvard Project researchers made
a special effort to assess the impact that Soviet socialization had on
various social domains, including the religious sphere. Inkeles and Bauer
[35]reported that the emigres experienced conflict in socialization related
to traditional values like religion. Some (especially people from peasant
and working class backgrounds) intimated that the public atheist
education led to clashes at home, with parents and grandparents often
looking askance at the atheistic beliefs children acquired at school.
To assess the impact that atheistic education had on Soviet citizens we
need to take a closer look at the educational practices insofar as they
entail what Ernest Q. Campbell [36] calls social control imperative and
socialization objective. [37] The former refers to vospitanie as it
endeavors to squelch religious impulses and relies on punishments for
religious behavior and attitudes. The latter involves building the free
atheist character, i.e., rewarding atheist and antireligious behavior and
attitudes. Some aspects of atheist upbringing seem to mix negative and
positive elements of socialization. Both punishment and reward factors are
evident when it comes to the legitimation problem that established
authorities face in their anti-religious propaganda. Rebellion or less
dramatic disregard for authority may lead to punishment, but acceptance
and recognition of the official messages may provide some direct rewards.
Let us review each major aspect of atheist upbringing -- building
legitimacy, socialization objectives, and social control requirements.
The Problem of Legitimacy. To legitimize itself in the public mind, the
state (government, party) can not rely exclusively on force; it must
socialize the populace into believing that its cause is a righteous one.
Thus, all children, future adult citizens, must learn to think that the state
knows the best, acts in everybody's interests, and can do the job of
improving social conditions in an efficient manner. Up to a point, the state
can count on loyalty of its citizens simply because it holds power and
carries out routine tasks without which life would be difficult. The state's
legitimacy has to strike deeper roots, however, if it is to be based on any
other foundation than force, and that means suppressing alternative
sources of legitimacy, most notably, the belief that governments rule by
the grace of God and require divine consent. The Soviet version of "civics

class," therefore, had to absorb atheistic education designed to clear up
"old religious prejudices" and make room for the doctrine that props up
the communist government.
More than that, Soviet educators sought to coopt religious sentiments by
creating quasi-ritual and ceremonial activities organized into so-called
"new socialist traditions." [38] Here is a list of common Soviet institutions
and rites sanctioned by the state:
(1) Sometime after World War II, Wedding Palaces sprang to life, where a
secular marriage ceremony was conducted in which newlyweds dedicated
themselves and their future children to building communism and
cultivating communist habits and beliefs. To inject a patriotic element into
marriage, Soviet couples were encouraged to visit local war memorials in
conjunction with their marriages.
(2) Secular funerals replaced appropriate religious ceremonies, with the
deceased celebrated for their contribution to the socialist state and the
survivors pledging to continue their patriotic deeds.
(3) Elaborate "rites of passage" solemnized such occasions as starting
school, graduations, entering the workforce, joining the Octobrists,
Pioneers, the young Communist League (Komsomol), acquiring identity
papers (internal passport), etc.
(4) The old religious holidays (like Christmas and Easter) were replaced
with New Year celebrations, May 1 demonstrations, the Bolshevik
Revolution Anniversary Parade, Lenin's birthday festivities, etc.
The success of these "new traditions" varied widely, but they seemed to
attract considerable popular participation. It is not clear whether they
effectively replaced comparable religious rites and ceremonies, but they
certainly helped cement the emotional bond between citizens and the
state. To the extent that such socialist rituals turned into public habits,
they enhanced the state's legitimacy. Most certainly, they strengthened
other messages the state sought to convey to its citizens, including those
with an expressly antireligious content. By providing a positive emotional
bond with the state, which itself promoted atheistic and antireligious
behaviors and attitudes, the new ceremonies and celebrations helped
engrain atheism in the person's self-identity. Being religious and at the
same time enjoying socialist rites would have created a psychological
dissonance. We know from many studies in social psychology that it is
difficult to maintain such inconsistencies for long periods without

consequences that are damaging to the person.
Socialization objectives. The atheistic socialization agenda included a wide
range of positive incentives. Proper behavior and attitudes were
reenforced by legitimate authority and thus carried a positive emotional
charge. Atheistic socialization had as its ultimate goal what Soviet writers
called "a scientific atheistic worldview," which included the following
elements:
(1) Strong scientific training awaited all students, starting from the
earliest grades. Science was always taught as the indubitable and entirely
sufficient way of understanding the world that left no room for alternative
orientations. All other perspectives, most notably religion, were said to be
incompatible with science and distorting of reality.
(2) A special emphasis was placed on the notion that humans make their
own futures. There were no supernatural forces or divine entities which
had any relation to the world. In Marxian terms, science was the surest
basis for building the future because it recognized the true nature of the
world.
(3) Atheistic socialization required teaching about the history of
freethought and atheism, as well as about "religious obscurantism" that
undermined the progress of science.
(4) Atheism had to have its "positive heroes" -- Charles Darwin, Galileo,
Copernicus, and others. The abundant literature on such characters served
an important socialization goal of creating "reference idols" to encourage
the youth in particular to emulate atheistic values. [39]
(5) Movies and newspapers, television and radio, literature and painting -all forms of mass culture had to be upgraded in content, so as to woo the
population away from religious spectacles. For instance, during the Easter
holidays the state would show especially popular programs on TV and
keep movie theaters open into the late hours to keep the populace from
attending all night Easter services.
(6) Atheist propaganda was carried out by a sprawling set of agencies and
organizations, such as the Museum of Religion and Atheism and
Knowledge Society, [40] which printed pamphlets and books, offered
public lectures and presentations.
Through all these socializing institutions and practices the authorities

sought to provide models of atheist behavior and attitudes for average
Soviet citizens, to turn them into "good atheists" intolerant of religioznoe
mrakobesie (religious obscurantism). But the same outcomes could be,
and sometimes had to be, accomplished through other means, like
punishments and costs inflicted on the believers to discourage them from
practicing proscribed behavior.
Social Control Imperatives. Soviet believers who evaded the socialization
efforts mounted by the state had to bear excessive costs for their religious
activities. The state did everything it could to "overcome" religion
peaceably, to make it "wither away," but when its "constructive" efforts
failed, it was ready to deploy a vast array of social control devices to
stamp out religious customs. Here are some of the more important social
control venues favored by the Soviet state:
(1) Forbidding formal religious education for children, that is, any group
classes, Sunday schools, etc.
(2) Hindering the participation of children in religious activities by
pressuring and intimidating clergy, parents, and children themselves
(usually in school).
(3) Controlling baptism rites, i.e., requiring a formal "registration" and a
"permit" for a baptism ceremony.
(4) Ridiculing or criticizing believers in the public press.
(5) Intentionally and actively seeking out believers and attempting to "reeducate" them. School teachers played a particularly important role in this
regard, as did Pioneer and Komsomol cadres, Party and trade union
activists at the workplace. Adults could also be force into one-on-one
sessions with atheist activists.
(6) Publishing and disseminating antireligious propaganda through
literature, lectures, newspaper articles, radio, and television programs.
The Knowledge Society has to be singled out here for its relentless efforts
on behalf of "scientific atheism," though the trade unions, party cells,
atheist clubs, and antireligious museums did not lag far behind.
(7) Manipulating religious leaders so as to limit their personal influence
and ability to organize and disseminate religious influence.
(8) Limiting the prospects for appointment and job advancement for

religious believers. Since most high level positions required party
membership, believers were naturally excluded from advancement to such
levels. In some cases, believers were denied routine pay increases and
promotions because of their "backward views." Though this was not
universal practice, it encouraged believers to be less visibly active
religiously or hide their faith altogether, and it intimidated those who were
not active from becoming so.
In these and perhaps other ways, the Soviet state barred children from
sympathetic exposure to religion and punished those who defied the state
and sought to exercise their nominal constitutional rights. Needless to say,
children who passed through this elaborate system of antireligious
propaganda were less likely to become religious adults, while those who
persisted in their religious beliefs and practices could expect their life
options to be severely curtailed by the state.
The Fate of Religion in the Post-Soviet Era
The atheist upbringing in Soviet society was fraught with many problems,
and as time revealed, had little resonance among the general population.
However, it had been undertaken in the context of the Russian religious
culture, and as such, was bound to have reverberated throughout society.
We can recall that Pravoslavie or Orthodoxy was imposed upon the pagan
population from above and never fully replaced the ancient religious
customs with the new forms of spirituality and spiritual discipline. Cultural
development nearly stopped at the point where Christian rituals were
implanted in everyday consciousness without transforming its spiritual
content. The Orthodox Church tended to equate religiosity with ritual. No
attempt was ever made by the Church to foster a religiously literate
population. In fact, for a long time, Russian Orthodoxy eschewed general
literacy as a worthy goal. Even less so was the religious establishment in
Russia committed to a critical inquiry into its spiritual moorings, to
instilling an open-minded attitude toward religious practices among its
participants. A kind of religious renaissance that the intellectual elite
experienced before the Revolution of 1917 came to a grinding halt after
the Bolsheviks came to power and made it all but impossible to convert
this movement into a popular religious renaissance. The communists'
attack on the Church exhausted its leadership and sealed its subservient
status in a relationship that harkens back to the Byzantine principle of
symphonia. Dogmatism, religious formalism, intolerance to dissent -some of the salient features of the Russian religious culture -- were
further reenforced by the autocratic communist practices. With religious
leaders and intellectuals effectively silenced, the common faithful had few

means of preserving anything more than a flawed memory of Orthodoxy
along with the sentimental attachment to the beauty of Russian Orthodox
liturgy. By the end of the Soviet era, Russians were a religiously
malformed people, who sustained heavy damage, both individually and
institutionally, from the decades of party-sponsored atheism overlain upon
centuries of religious submission to autocracy.
While Orthodoxy is prone to celebrate its martyrs above all saints, nobody
is denying the blessings that religious freedom gave to the believers in the
mid-80s. Religious freedom had arrived, first, surreptitiously, as the state
lapsed in its efforts to enforce antireligious laws, then more openly,
beginning with the decision to release religious prisoners of conscience in
1986-87. From that point on, believers faced fewer problems registering
their congregations. Liberalization gained momentum after the 1988
festivities surrounding the thousand years of Russian Orthodoxy. This
glorious event opened up auspiciously with General Secretary Gorbachev
granting an audience to the Patriarch and chief bishops. About the same
time, drafts of new laws on "freedom of conscience and religious
organizations" reached the public. After extended public discussion, final
versions thereof were adopted by both the U.S.S.R. and the Russian
Republic in October 1990. These laws eliminated the primary means by
which the Soviet government waged its war on religion since the end of
the 1920s and finally permitted -- for the first time in over fifty years -what most people elsewhere in the world would consider normal religious
worship. [41] The Orthodox and other religious believers in the USSR
were just getting adapted to the new circumstances when the whole state
structure of the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991.
Seldom does a religious institution find itself in such a truly historic
circumstance as that which the Russian Church faces today. The changes
engulfing Russia have portents not only for its citizens but for the whole
world. A vigorous, decisive, democratic church might wield great influence
on the direction of those important changes. Such a church would possess
a social ethic conducive to democratic ideology and free market
entrepreneurship. It would spearhead a debate about society's values and
goals, as well as spell out its own agenda in the various arenas of policy
planning. It would exercise its spiritual influence on the population and
shape the spiritual identity of the newly emerging autonomous nation. To
paraphrase Richard John Neuhaus, a Protestant theologian, such a church
should be a visible presence in the public square. Has the Russian
Orthodox Church established a permanent residence there?
Physically, the Russian Orthodox Church is quickly re-establishing itself on

the town square. Since 1988, when Gorbachev and the leaders of the
Russian Orthodox Church met for the first time, the number of
congregations and operating churches has burgeoned. According to one
source, this number nearly doubled between 1985 and 1991, going from
6,806 to approximately 12,000 [42] . However, the costs of this
expansion have been extremely high. Without many outlets for its
resources, the Russian Church had grown used to being relatively well off
under the Soviets. Now, the Church has been essentially bankrupted by its
rapid expansion. We should bear in mind that institutions are real and
organized societal beings, that they are in conflict and competition for the
hearts of the people. So far, the state has been a big winner in its
competition with the Russian Church. The question now is whether the
religious institution has the means to mount a new drive to better
counter-balance over-etatization in society.
The Church's bankruptcy is apparent not only in monetary terms. The
Church's spiritual and theological resources are stretched to the limit, as
well. First, there are not enough clergy to serve all the new parishes.
Second, the Church does not have the ability to compensate adequately
those who are serving. Third, to satisfy the growing demand for clergy,
priests work excessive hours, with very little time left for new initiatives or
even simple reflection. Furthermore, the Church has yet to address fully
and effectively (which is not easy to do under the present trying
circumstances) the serious issue of the theological preparation of the
clergy. As in the past, the Church has stressed the liturgical preparation of
its clerics over their intellectual or spiritual preparations. Recognizing that
the people of the parishes want someone to provide the sacraments,
baptize, marry, and bury them, the Church has responded by enlarging
seminary classes without the requisite increase in faculty and staff. New
teaching resources are sorely missing; there is a tendency to fall back on
the nineteenth century and earlier precedents. Very little constructive
energy has been expended to find the meeting ground
between Pravoslavie and twentieth century religious experience. In other
words, while the church may be re-occupying the public square physically
-- by breaking into the open, reaching out to the public, reclaiming its
property once confiscated by the state -- it has yet to occupy the square
spiritually, as a social force to reckon with in the giant reconstruction now
facing the nation.
We cannot be too harsh in our judgment, though, for the problems facing
the Russian Orthodox Church are enormous, indeed. The devout Russian
Orthodox believer needs first and foremost a "spiritual father"; he needs
to restore the historical bond with a priest or monk with whom he has a

special relationship of trust and confidence. Alas, the clergy today are too
overburdened with the ritual services to provide inspiration, spiritual
guidance, and a clear vision of the future to everyone. But we need to
remind ourselves that Russia is not the only place where religious
institutions show signs of exhaustion. Richard John Neuhaus expressed his
deep concerns about the disappearance of religious values and symbols
from public discourse in America in the 80s [43] . We can hardly expect
that such values and symbols could spring to life overnight under the
extreme conditions in today's Russia. Moreover, we have to be concerned
about the abuse of religious rhetoric by the leaders of nativist, ultraconservative movements. Numerous right wing political and nationalist
groups have risen up in Russia since the onset of Perestroika, some of
them tracing their roots back to pre-revolutionary movements. Some of
the leaders of such groups have begun utilizing religious language in their
calls for a return of Russia to her "greater destiny", and there are
noteworthy proponents among the clergy and hierarchs of the Russian
Orthodox Church who appear to be supporters. Traditional Russian
Orthodox anti-semitism has not been bridled on the extreme wings, and it
supports the reappearance in bookstalls of the scurrilous Protocols of the
Elders of Zion and other hate literature. While Patriarch Alexii II has
denied anti-semitism in Church affairs, his administration has not
mounted a direct attack on this problem. Without church leadership in this
regard, Pamyat and similar nationalist-patriotic groupings have pursued
their dark agendas with the support of extremist churchmen who
experience no censure from their spiritual authorities. [44]
In the legal arena itself, the Church has decided to be silent. Several
major churchmen were elected to the Gorbachev and then Russian
Federation Parliament, including the Patriarch, the most powerful bishops,
and a number of priests. Yet last year, the Patriarch ruled that clergy were
no longer permitted to run for such offices. When Father Gleb Yakunin
defied the decree, he was defrocked and publicly humiliated by the
Patriarch. Ironically, Yakunin had been at odds with the Church hierarchy
for nearly all his adult life. In 1991, he revealed some KGB records (since
sealed) that indicated the close cooperation between several key bishops
and the Soviet secret police. In 1993, from his seat in the Russian
Parliament, Fr. Yakunin vigorously opposed the legislation on religious
affairs sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church. The law would have
reinstated registration for all religious groups and organizations, limited
the activities of foreign missionaries in Russia, and restored the Russian
Orthodox Church's privileged position in the land. The manner in which
the Patriarchate treated Fr. Yakunin indicates its unwillingness to engage
in debate over its own position in Russian society, its freedom to stamp

out dissent among its ranks, its right to limit alternative forms of religious
expression. This stance showed no tolerance for diversity, nor did it
encourage constructive debate with its opponents inside and outside the
Church. Dissenting views were handled in a sadly familiar way: exclusion,
condemnation, excommunication.
Only in the areas of direct interest to the Church has the latter taken an
active role in the political process. Otherwise, as the run-up to the
December 1993 elections demonstrated, the Church authorities failed to
connect their faith and their politics. No sense of moral obligation seemed
to inform the clergy's politics, which is conspicuous for its absence in the
seminaries, where no attempt is currently under way to initiate a coherent
political discussion. This public square was naked indeed. The
predominant impulse was to escape from the tough political fray into the
comforting spiritual ether of the liturgy. Perhaps these developments will
take time to unfold, but a religious culture that could sustain them is yet
to take root. The cultural history I sketched above does not bode well for
the Church's action in the public arena, certainly not in the immediate
future.
There are some rays of hope, however. A tiny minority of Orthodox did
join Protestant and Catholic dissenters in movements of protest in the
60s, 70s and 80s; the dissidents of the 90s challenge the Church to lay
out a new path through Russian nationalism or secular democratic
institutions that meets the current needs and fills the spiritual vacuum left
by the collapse of Marxist ideology. Gleb Yakunin and his colleagues
among Christian democrats are trying to include religious values and
ideals in the public debates about Russia's future. Priests and lay activists
here and there are embarking on programs of direct involvement in sociopolitical life through community or educational initiatives.
Another promising sign is the widespread Sunday School movement that
could foster a religious literacy previously unknown among the Russian
Orthodox. It could also encourage a religious voluntarism that offers a
healthy antidote to excessive hierarchical control.
Another bit of evidence that some believers in Russia are rising to the
occasion and meeting current challenges is the spread of charitable
projects enlivening churches around the country. Still in its infancy, the
movement to set up special services for the elderly, the imprisoned, the
infirm, and the impoverished may invigorate Russian Orthodoxy as a
whole. Together with international organizations and services, it may help

spread a new social ethic of responsibility.
Finally, there are some signs that the crusty Church hierarchy is not
totally inflexible. The Patriarchate itself sponsored a major interfaith
conference in June 1994 dedicated to the search for solutions to
interethnic and other conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
It was noteworthy that representatives of all major confessions on former
Soviet territory were invited and included among the delegates. An
ecumenical spirit concerning the solution of these conflicts was strongly
expressed by the conferees; such cooperative efforts may bear fruits even
in the more directly religious sphere itself. This conference was
particularly important in that it broke the mold of the Communist past,
when discussions were limited to restricted topics, and the Russian
churchmen were compelled to keep public statements in line with Party
doctrine. This time, conversations in the halls and hotel rooms were frank,
and disputes were publicly aired in ways not thought possible before the
last few years.
In the meantime, the Church establishment tends to revert to ancient
patterns, seeking to maintain or reestablish its privileged status in Russian
society. It is particularly incensed with the non-Orthodox religious groups
engaged in a major push to convert Russians to a different view, to offer
the population a new way in the context of religious freedom. Seeing the
troops of the Western evangelistic crusade gathered in stadiums in prayer,
the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy launched its own campaign to put
up barriers between the spiritual invaders and the Russian people. The
Summer of 1993 saw a fascinating legislative battle waged in Moscow in
which Orthodox spiritual discipline was at issue. The Church hierarchy
sought to construct a wall between the missionaries and the Russians, to
keep the missionaries at bay, to keep the Russian spiritual menu clear of
unsafe (though savory) contaminants like Western religion. Had it not
been for the confrontation between President Yeltsin and the Parliament in
early October, the legislation limiting the access of Western evangelicals
to Russia might now be on the books. Yeltsin had opposed this legislation
on several grounds but might not have been able to completely reject it in
the end. The Church's determination to limit religious freedom is facing
great criticism from democrats inside Russia as well as external advocates
of individualistic human rights.
The path ahead is a tortuous one. Old elements must be purged, to be
sure, but the bedrock of the tradition cannot be abandoned. The cultural
transformation required is vast; it may be excruciatingly painful, given
that Pravoslavie faces its reconstruction exhausted by the Communist era,

and now further drained by the huge costs of energy, time, and money
required for rebuilding its crumbling infrastructure. While thousands of
church buildings have been returned to the Church, most of them are in
need of extensive and costly repair; many are, in the words of one bishop,
"simply ruins" that must be totally reconstructed. There is an acute
shortage of clergy, so the Church has to focus on the quick training of
ritual specialists. And yet, somehow, the Church must develop the broader
pastoral, theological, and philosophical concerns that could fill the public's
needs the most. Can the Church find the resources to serve the great
spiritual needs of the liberated population? Or will other aspirants to the
status of religious supplier to Russia become more successful in fulfilling
these yearnings, thus leading the transformation of Russian religious
culture away from its historical Orthodox roots?
Experience in other countries suggests that, if general religious freedom
persists, Russia is likely to become a great deal more diverse in its
religious culture. While Orthodoxy recoups its strengths, other "religious
entrepreneurs" will win a significant share of the religious market in
Russia. Still, the daunting question persists: will the Orthodox Church
continue to stress the form, encourage nativistic elements in the
government, and deny the newer groups access to the population? Stated
differently, will the Church put nationalistic goals and church-state unity
above service to the spiritual needs of the population?
One element that is affecting the Russian religious scene these days as
never before is international religious culture. Historically, Russia was
insulated from the outside religious currents. Now, it cannot afford to be
completely isolated. Though the Russian Orthodox Church has grown
weary of ecumenical efforts, this international element gives one hope
that it will continue to evolve in order to serve better its members'
spiritual needs. Global culture may provide some of the innovations that
will stimulate the broader revival of religion in Russia. The mature postcommunist Russia that one day will emerge after this present period of
massive reconstruction will not simply ape Western society, as so many
outsiders who put their entire stock in capitalist economics insist. We
cannot say which shape the Russian civilization will take in the future, but
we can venture a guess that it will reflect both the nation's historical
religious afterimages and its present religious experience that whittles
away at the old religious culture and broadens the horizons of Russian
Orthodoxy.
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